INTRODUCTION
Wage policy has long been recognized as a key determinant of firm success (Dulebohn and Werling, 2007) . By setting the level and the structure of internal rewards the wage policy defines the position of a firm compared to the pay systems offered by competitors and drives the capability to attract and retain a workforce endowed with the required characteristics (Werner and Werd, 2004) . A fair distribution of pays across jobs requiring differentiated efforts affects the satisfaction of employees for the treatment received relative to their peers (Atkinson, 2007) and improves industrial relations and internal climate. In addition, a properly designed wage policy balances the contrasting needs of raising wages to increase employees' effort and commitment and limiting labour costs in favour of firm profitability (Brown et al., 2003) .
Literature on wage determinants and firm-level wage policy often contrasts the models of the internal and the external labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) . Whereas the former is based on higher than average wage rates and limited ports of entry to encourage internal career paths and long-term employment relationships, the latter places emphasis on internal and external competition to access the most critical and best rewarded jobs. If empirical tests usually support the basic stylised facts of internal labour markets for large organisations, they also recognise significant deviations from the standard model (see e.g. Creedy and Whitfield, 1988; Baker et al., 1994; Trebe et al., 2001; Grund, 2005; Eriksson and Werwatz, 2005; Hassink and Russo, 2008) . In addition, the shift to a knowledge-based economy characterised by intense ICT-backed exchanges of information and goods, velocity, and outsourcing (Child and McGrath, 2001 ) underlines the growing importance of external forces in shaping levels and growth rates of internal wages (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988; Lazear and Oyer, 2004; Dulebohn and Werling, 2007; Bayo-Moriones et al., 2008 and .
The availability of suitable data historically represented the main obstacle to empirical analyses of the wage policy at the firm level, as they require detailed information on employer and employee characteristics, wage levels, wage structure and wage dynamics. Most of the existing studies at the firm level are based on single or limited cases (Baker et al., 1994; Grund, 2005; Lin, 2005) and consequently their output cannot be generalised. A new impulse to the study of wage policy patterns at the firm level comes from the growing availability of longitudinal matched employer-employee datasets (Eriksson and Werwatz, 2005; Lazear and Shaw, 2009a) . The availability of detailed employee information linked with employer data for a wide set of firms promises to allow for the identification of general wage policies and their drivers. This paper provides new insight on wage policy models at the firm level by exploring the wage policy patters displayed by a sample of Italian medium and large firms. The proposed exploratory empirical analysis identifies two distinct patterns of wage policy among sampled firms, i.e. High Payers and Low Payers. In addition, the paper outlines the drivers underpinning those patterns and provides preliminary evidence on the dynamics of wage policy at the firm level. The empirical analyses presented in this paper are part of the output of the research programme "Flexible wages for flexible contracts? The dynamics of the relationship between wage policy and employment contracts at the firm level", founded by the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 2 . Most of the existing analyses of wage policy models are based on econometric estimates where firm-level indicators of wage level, wage structure and wage dynamics play the role of either dependent variables (see, e.g., Eriksson and Werwatz, 2005) or independent variables (see, e.g., Cardoso, 2000; Brown et al., 2003) . In contrast, the research programme mentioned above resorted to cluster analysis to classify the wage policies adopted by sampled firms according to their degree of alignment with the ideal types identified in the literature. The advantage of cluster analysis is that it allows capturing non-linear interactions among key features of wage policy patterns that are hard to test in traditional empirical specifications.
The examination of the wage policy patters displayed by Italian medium and large firms is The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next session briefly reviews the literature on wage policy at the firm level. Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical analysis, whereas the fourth section illustrates the output of the cluster analysis to classify wage policy patterns and sketches the dynamics observed between 1989 and 2004. Section 5 discusses the determinants of the identified wage policy patterns. The last section provides some concluding remarks.
2 Suleman et al. (2013, this issue) 
WAGE POLICIES AT THE FIRM LEVEL
From the original roots in personnel economics the empirical research on the determinants of wage policy at the firm level has developed along two parallel lines characterised by different sources of data: personnel files from large companies on the one hand (for Lin, 2005) , and matched employer-employee data on the other (Lazear and Shaw, 2009b) .
Personnel files from large companies have been used to characterise the wage policy of single firms or a reduced number of firms over time (Baker et al., 1994; Seltzer and Merret, 2000; Lin, 2005; Grund, 2005; Seltzer, 2010) . Contributions based on personnel data highlight the stability of wage policy in time (Baker et al., 1994) , the relevance of the institutional setting (Grund, 2005; Seltzer, 2010) and the co-existence of typical features of the internal labour market with contrasting practices such as external recruitment at higher hierarchical levels (Baker et al., 1994; Seltzer, 2010) . Following the pioneer contribution by Medoff and Abraham (1981) , some researchers used personnel data to test the neoclassical prediction that wage increases reflect growth in employee productivity (Lazear, 1998; Flabbi and Ichino, 2001; Dohmen, 2004) . These studies suggest that individual productivity plays a minor role in explaining wage differentials, wage growth and rising seniority-wage profiles.
The studies based on matched employer-employee data focus on industry-specific, firmspecific and individual-specific sources of wage variability. The existing evidence is far from conclusive. For instance, Groschen (1991) argues that occupation-specific and establishmentspecific effects explain over 90% of the wage variability observed in a sample of US employees from six industries. In contrast, based on French data Abowd et al. (1999) stress the prevalence of unobserved individual heterogeneity over firm effects in explaining individual wages.
The empirical evidence on firm-level wage policies of Italian firms has been limited so far. Flabbi and Ichino (2001) use personnel data from a large Italian retail banking firm to replicate and extend the analysis on the determinants of the wage-seniority profile developed by Medoff and Abraham (1981) . Based on a range of direct measures of productivity (supervisors' evaluation, recorded absenteeism and misconduct episodes), Flabbi and Ichino (2001) show that the rising profile of wages with seniority depends on individual productivity only at the lowest hierarchical levels. Della Torre and Solari (2011) use a sample of over 3,300 Italian manufacturing firms to examine the impact of wage levels and intra-firm wage dispersion on employees' behaviour in terms of absenteeism and voluntary turnover. The results of the analysis suggest that the wage policy of firms has significant mediating and moderating effects on the relationship between the variable components of the reward system and employees' behaviour. Based on WHIP, the same dataset used in this paper, Contini et al. (2009) offer an overall picture of wage distribution and wage dynamics in Italy during the 1990s. The authors provide evidence in support of a significant differentiation of firm-level wage policies by showing the existence of a sizable within-firm wage dispersion that accounts for about two thirds of the total wage variance in the Italian private sector and is about twice the observed between-firm wage variability. The existence of a "tide rising all boats" effect suggests significant differences in pay levels. The higher the mean wage paid by a firm, the higher the mean wage paid across all occupations in that firm, but also the higher the observed within-firm wage dispersion. In addition, characteristics like gender, geographic area and industry account for a minor share of the total variance of wages, which seem to be driven by seniority and occupations.
Overall, the brief survey provided above suggest that firms implement differentiated wage policies that lead to different reward systems. However, additional research is needed to identify specific wage policy patterns and their implications for employers and employees. Researchers suggest that this goal may be pursued by enlarging the range of factors considered in the analysis of wage policy drivers to include occupations (Lazear, 1995) and workplace internal and external characteristics (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988; Bayo-Moriones et al., 2008 and Desjardins and Rubenson, 2011) . Administrative data such as WHIP are based on objective measures and their reliability is crosschecked by all interested actors, including employers, employees and public officers. Thus they provide a more reliable source of information compared to survey data, as the latter are affected to a larger extent by subjective evaluation and measurement error.
DATA
The analysis proposed in this paper is based on pooled matched employer-employee data reported by WHIP in 1989 and 2004 . Due to the limited differentiation of wage policies among smaller companies, the empirical analysis includes only larger firms, i.e. those over 100 employees. In addition, since WHIP reports a random selection rather than the universe of the individuals employed by Italian private firms, focus on larger firms allows increasing the number of employment relationships observed for each firm and year. 
CLUSTERS OF WAGE POLICIES
The cluster analysis used to identify the wage policy patterns adopted by sampled firms is based on a set of 13 variables that describe the wage policy of the firm in terms of wage level, wage structure and wage dynamics (Table 3 ).
Wage level, that "represents a firm's average compensation relative to that of other, competing organizations" (Brown et al., 2003, p. 752) , is synthesised by two variables 4 . The former is the mean gross hourly wage by firm (variable mean_hwage in Table 3 ); the latter is the ratio of the mean firm wage to the mean 2-digit industry wage (wage_position).
The wage structure, i.e. "the array of pay rates within the organization" that represents "the degree of slope in its pay policies" (Brown et al., 2003, p. 753) , is described by eight distinct indexes. The former two variables (the standard deviation of gross hourly wage, sd_hwage, and the Gini index of gross hourly wage dispersion, Gini_idx) assess overall wage dispersion at the firm level. The following two variables characterise wage variability across occupations and hierarchy by measuring the Spearman correlation between occupation and wage (occupation_wage_corr) and the Pearson correlation between tenure and wage (tenure_wage_corr). The mean gross hourly wage for the core (i.e., the modal) occupation (variable mean_hwage_corejob_stayers), the mean gross hourly wage for new entrants (mean_hwage_newentrants) and the wage differential between incumbents and new entrants (Entry_wage_gap) assess the preference of the firm for either internal competence development or recruitment from the external labour market. The last variable used to describe the wage structure of sampled firms is the average number of employees per job grade (Employees_per_jobgrade). This variable captures the compression of the hierarchical structure and it is measured as the ratio of the number of observed employees per firm to the number of distinct job grades reported by WHIP for those employees.
The last set of variables that enter the cluster analysis describes the wage dynamics of sampled firms. Indexes are calculated based on the wage differentials observed for firm stayers in two subsequent years (1988-1989 and 2003-2004, respectively) . The first two variables measure the mean and the standard deviation of wage growth at the firm level (mean_wage_growth and sd_hwage_growth). The last variable assesses the elasticity of the mean wage to the regional unemployment rate and accounts for the sensitivity of firm-level wage policy to the economic cycle. and wage policy patterns. The specific clustering algorithm adopted is a two-step clustering procedure (Chiu et al., 2001) . The first step of the algorithm groups observations into preclusters based on a log-likelihood distance criterion. The second step applies standard hierarchical clustering to preclusters and identifies the optimal number of clusters as the solution that maximizes the increase in distance between the two closest clusters compared to the immediately less numerous solution.
Firm-level variables concerning wage level, wage structure and wage dynamics were calculated only when the WHIP dataset sampled at least 10 employees per firm and year. The number of observations available for the cluster analysis thus shrinks from 4,576 to 4,114. The use of a two-step clustering procedure with the variables described in the above section on the WHIP dataset identified two sets of wage policies as the solution characterised by the most statistically distinct clusters (Table 4 ). The first cluster includes 1,154 firms, whereas the second cluster counts 2,960 firms.
Based on the characteristics reported in Both Low Payers and High Payers display a negative elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate in the local labour market. Nevertheless, the absolute elasticity of the latter is much higher. A 1% increase in the regional unemployment rate is associated with a decrease of the gross wages of about 0.9% in the case of Low Payers and a decrease of over 2.5% in the case of High Payers. 5 Due to selection criteria (at least 100 employees and at least 10employment relationships per year recorded in WHIP), mean firm size is much higher among selected firms than for the whole WHIP sample. vs. 64.7%). However, and contrary to the prediction from empirical analyses with personnel records (Baker et al., 1994) , a non-negligible share of firms (28.9%) switches to a different wage policy pattern. Overall, firms in the High Payers cluster increase from 21.1% to 35.2% of the sub-sample. 
WAGE POLICY DRIVERS
The probability of membership in the cluster High Payers is estimated via a binary model with a logistic cumulative distribution function in the following form:
where HighPayer is a binary variable that takes value 1 if a firm is classified in the cluster High Payers and 0 if it is classified in the cluster Low Payers; ' i X is the transposed vector of the values assumed by an array of firm-specific explanatory variables and  is the coefficient vector to estimate. Table 6 reports the results of the regression estimate. The proposed regression explains a sizable share of the variance observed in the data (Nagelkerke R-Square = 0.433) and correctly classifies 81% of observations. In line with the findings of the literature (see, e.g., Contini et al., 2009) , firm size is a significant driver of the propensity to pay market leading wage rates. The
Wage policy patterns at the firm level: An analysis on Italian medium and large firms ______________________________________________________________________________________ DINÂMIA'CET -IUL, Centro de Estudos sobre a Mudança Socioeconómica e o Território ISCTE-IUL -Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL Tel. 210464031 -Extensão 293100 E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt www.dinamiacet.iscte.pt larger the firm, the higher the odds of being a High Payer rather than a Low Payer. Workforce age has a similar impact on the dependent variable: the higher the mean age of employees, the higher the probability of membership in the cluster High Payers. In addition, as intuitively shown by the data in Table 5 , the propensity to be a High Payer grows in time. The odds of being a member of the cluster High Payers in 2004 are more than twice compared to 1989.
Workforce tenure displays a negative impact on the probability of adopting a wage policy based on high wage levels and high wage dispersion. This finding suggests that the most required and best paid skills are characterised by a high degree of inter-firm transferability and that fast track careers probably develop across multiple employers. In line with prior findings of the literature, also the share of blue collar employees, the share of female employees and the share of part-time employees increase the probability that a firm will adopt a Low Payer wage policy model. Contrary to the intuition that the resort to temporary contracts involves low skilled and poorly paid workers, the coefficient of the share of permanent employees is negative, yet non statistically significant. Eventually, the results of the binary logistic estimate show that firms located in the Southern regions of Italy experience a stronger probability of adopting a wage policy based on the Low Payer model. 
Concluding remarks
Based on a sample of medium and large Italian companies, the cluster analysis provided in this paper shows the existence of significantly differentiated wage policies at the firm level. Firms in the cluster of High Payers present leaner organisational structures with a comparably lower number of hierarchical levels and are market leaders in pay rates and wage raises. However, High Payers are also characterised by higher wage inequality, steeper wage differentials across occupations and stronger sensitivity to the conditions in the external labour market. The lower correlation between wage and tenure and the negligible differential between the wage of firm stayers in the modal occupation and the wage of new entrants suggest that High Payers are willing to recruit the skills and competence they need in the external labour market. In contrast with High Payers, Low Payers seem to privilege internal career paths through a stronger emphasis on wage-seniority rising profiles, more articulated hierarchical levels and sizable wage differentials between incumbent employees and new entrants. However, the alignment of provided pay levels with the prevailing wage rates in the reference industry contrasts with the development of internal skills according to the model of the internal labour market. In summary, the wage policy patterns identified by the cluster analysis do not align with the ideal types of the internal and the external labour markets hypothesised in the literature but rather present a mix of hybrid characteristics.
The proposed empirical analysis also underlines the existence of significant dynamic patterns in the wage policy models adopted by sampled firms. Contrary to prior literature findings that suggest strong persistence of wage policy at the firm level (Baker et al., 1994) 
